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CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
-;, This article examines a number of criminal law defenses: 
duress, necessity, intoxication, alibi, accident, mistake of 
fact, and mistake of law. Self-defense and entrapment were 
discussed in earlier articles this year. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
R.C. Section 2901.05(C) defines an affirmative defense 
·:~li as one either (1) expressly designated as such by statute or 
(2) "involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the accused." This classification is important 
because it affects the two burdens of proof. By definition, an 
affirmative defense cast the burden of production (or going 
forward with evidence) on to the defendant. If the defendant 
fails to satisfy this burden, the jury will not be instructed on 
the defense. Moreover, in Ohio the burden of persuasion on 
an affirmative defense is allocated to the defendant and the 
{j) standard of proof is a "preponderance of the evidence:' 
R.C. 2901.05(A) provides that the "burden of going forward 
with the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden 
of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirma-
tive defense, is upon the accused." 
Affirmative defenses in Ohio include self-defense, insani-
ty, entrapment, and duress. The Ohio cases state that intox-
ication is also an affirmative defense but this is question-
able. The term non-affirmative defense typically refers to 
defenses that negate an element of a crime. One commen-
tator refers to these as "failure of proof" defenses: "General 
defenses differ conceptually from failure of proof defenses in 
that the former bar conviction even if all elements of the of-
fense are satisfied, whereas the latter prevent conviction by 
negating a required element of the offense." 1 Robinson, 
Criminal Law Defenses§ 22, 72-73 (1994). Mistake of fact, 
accident, and intoxication negate the required mental state 
for some crimes; the prosecution must prove that mental 
state beyond a reasonable doubt. Alibi negates the actus 
reus of the crime; here, again, the prosecution must prove 
that the accused committed the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
DURESS 
Duress, also known as coercion or compulsion, is recog-
nized as a defense to criminal liability under some circum-
stances. "The common law defense of duress is long stand-
ing." State v. Metcalf; 60 Ohio App.2d 212, 214, 396 N.E.2d 
786 (1977). 
"The rationale of the defense of duress is that, for rea-
sons of social policy, it is better that the defendant, faced 
with a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil (violate 
the criminal law) in order to avoid the greater evil threatened 
by the other person:· 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive 
Criminal Law§ 5.3, at 614 (1986). The Ohio Supreme 
Court has noted that the underlying theme is ''that imminent, 
immediate danger or threat of danger prevents the actor 
from exercising his own will, and there is no alternate path 
to take. Therefore, the actor is forced to choose between 
the lesser of two evils." State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 
483 n. 2, 391 N.E.2d 319 (1979). See also United States v. 
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415 (1980) ("An escapee who flees 
from a jail that is in the process of burning may well be enti-
tled to an instruction on duress or necessity, 'for he is not to 
be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt."') (citing 
United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 487 (1869)). 
In State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 488, 391 N.E.2d 
319 (1979), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the common 
law duress defense applied to a charge of escape from de-
tention. The Court also noted: 
It must be understood that the defense of necessity or 
duress is strictly and extremely limited in application 
and will probably be effective in very rare occasions. It 
is a defense and not a conjured afterthought. All the 
conditions must be met, and the court must find as a 
matter of Jaw that the evidence is sufficient to warrant 
an instruction on the affirmative defense of necessity 
or duress. 
Duress has been raised as a defense to numerous 
crimes, including robbery, burglary, malicious mischief, kid-
napping, arson, prison escape, and possession of weapons. 
See 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.3(b), at 
619 (1986). The Ohio cases include prosecutions for es-
cape, robbery, kidnapping, and drug offenses. E.g., State v. 
Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482,391 N.E.2d 319 (1979) (escape); 
State v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio St. 63, 95 N.E. 381 (1911) (rob-
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bery); State v. Luff, 85 Ohio App.3d 785, 621 N.E.2d 493 
(1993) (kidnapping); State v. Metcalf, 60 Ohio App.2d 212, 
396 N.E.2d 786 (1977) (sale of marijuana). 
Homicide 
Duress is generally not a defense to murder. As one 
commentator has noted: 
[T]he case law in the absence of statute has generally 
held that duress cannot justify murder- or, as it is bet-
ter expressed since duress may justify the underlying 
felony and so justifY what would otherwise be a felony 
murder, duress cannot justify the intentional killing of 
(or attempt to kill) an innocent third person." 1 LaFave 
& Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 5.3(b), at 616-17 
(1986). 
The Ohio cases are in accord. E.g., State v. McCray, 103 
Ohio App.3d 109, 118-19,658 N.E.2d 1076 {1995) {"Even 
the affirmative defense of duress cannot justify the taking of 
an innocent life."); State v. Luff, 85 Ohio App.3d 785, 621 
N.E.2d 493 (1993) (duress raised to kidnapping but not ag-
gravated murder); State v. Metcalf, 60 Ohio App.2d 212, 
215, 396 N.E.2d 786 (1977) ("[T]he defense of duress is un-
available where one takes an innocent life:'). In this context, 
the "choice evils" equation breaks down; there is no lesser 
evil. 
Burden of Proof 
State v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio St. 63, 70, 95 N.E. 381 
(1911 ), a leading case in Ohio, held that duress is an affir-
mative defense. The Ohio Supreme Court wrote: "In the 
nature of things this was an affirmative defense, one which 
it was incumbent on the defendant to make out by a prepon-
derance of the evidence." In reaching this result, the Court 
concluded that duress was like insanity and self-defense. 
"His plea is not that he did not participate in the robbery: did 
not intend to do the act, but that his intent was controlled by 
an outside force, vis: duress. This being an affirmative de-
fense the burden of proving it was on the defendant, and the 
trial court did not err in refusing to put thci.t burden on the 
State." ld. at 73. See also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 
394, 415 (1980) ("an affirmative defense - here that of 
duress or necessity"). 
Subsequent cases have continued to treat duress as an 
affirmative defense. State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 488, 
391 N.E.2d 319 (1979) ("affirmative defense of necessity or 
duress."); State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 21,294 N.E.2d 
888 (1973) (Affirmative defenses in Ohio include "duress"). 
Therefore both the burden of production and burden of per-
suasion (by a preponderance of the evidence) are allocated 
to the defendant. R.C. 2901.05(A). 
Reasonableness 
The defense of duress is judged by an objective stan-
dard. Not only must the defendant have a subjective (good 
faith) belief but that belief must be reasonable. In United 
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,410-11 {1980), the U.S. 
Supreme Court observed: "Clearly, in the context of prison 
escape, the escapee is not entitled to claim a defense of 
duress or necessity unless and until he demonstrates that, 
given the imminence of the threat, violation of § 751 (a) was 
his only reasonable alternative." 
The Ohio cases are in accord. In State v. Harkness, 75 
Ohio App.3d 7, 11, 598 N.E.2d 836 (1991), the court of ap-
peals wrote that the "appellant subjectively believed, and 
there was objective evidence to support the belief, that were 
he to be placed in jail he must be subject to serious bodily 
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injury or death as the result of his activities as a police infor-
mant:' See also State v. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 256, 
156 N.E.2d 840 (1959) ("a well-grounded apprehension of 
present, imminent, and impending death or serious bodily 
injury ... [and] it was reasonable for him to believe that he 
could not avoid participation in the robbery without immedi- @j; 
ate exposure to death or great bodily injury"). 
Nature of Threat 
In State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 487, 391 N.E.2d 
319 (1979), the CoUrt recognized that "[o]ne of the essential 
features of a necessity or duress defense is the sense of 
present, imminent, immediate and impending death, or seri-
ous bodilyinjury. There is no such evidence in the present 
cause, for the defendant simply had a cold, saw an opening 
and escaped: A common cold is hardly a substantial health 
impairment that affected his health in an imminent wav:· 
The defendant argued that his health, safety, and legal inter-
ests were being neglected by prison officials. The Court 
concluded, however, that the defendant had not made out a 
duress defense. There was "no specific.threat of death, 
forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily impairment in the 
defendant's immediate future." The Court further remarked: 
We are not faced with a situation where an inmate may 
be forced to flee a burning prison to save his life; or a 
situation where an inmate must choose between 
death, beating or homosexual advances. The evi-
dence reveals that the conditions were not desirable, 
and that there was no substantial health impairment. 
We concur with other courts which have held that un-
desirable prison conditions are not sufficient to justify 
an escape or make one necessary. ld. at 487 (citations 
omitted). 
See also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409 (1980) 
("Duress was said to excuse criminal conduct where the 
actor was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or se-
rious bodily injury, which threat caused the actor to engage 
in conduct violating the literal terms of the criminal law:'). 
State v. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 265, 156 N.E.2d 840 
(1959), also illustrates this point. In that case, the court of 
appeals commented that: 
the defendant did not participate in the robbery of his 
own volition but because of a well-grounded apprehen-
sion of present, imminent, and impending death or se-
rious bodily injury at the hands of these men if he did 
not; that it was reasonable for him to believe that he 
could not avoid participation in the robbery without im-
mediate exposure to death or great bodily injury; that 
he seized the first opportunity reasonably safe for him 
to desist from such participation; and that he refused 
to escape, when opportunity offered, from no con-
sciousness of wrongdoing. 
Threat to Others 
The duress defense extends to a threat to another per-
son. As one writer observed: "Doubtless a reasonable fear 
of immediate death or serious bodily injury to someone 
other than the defendant, such as a member of his family, 
will do." 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.3, 
at 614 (1986). The court of appeals in State v. Metcalf, 60 
Ohio App.2d 212,216,396 N.E.2d 786 (1977), wrote: 
Although only sparse authority exists on the issue of 
whether the duress is available where the offender 
seeks to protect others such as the members of his 
family, we conclude that both reasoning and precedent 
i 
·' 
in the context of the law of necessity dictate that the 
defense of duress may be invoked not only where the 
defendant fears for his own safety but, also, where he 
fears for the safety of others, in particular the members 
(/ of his family. 
The court went on to note that the trial court erred because 
it had not included in the instruction "some reference to the 
defendant's concern for his wife, the children, his cousin and 
the guest in his house." ld. at 216. See also State v. Luff, 
85 Ohio App.3d 785, 804, 621 N.E.2d 493 (1993) (kidnap-
ping charge) ("Luff testified that Lundgren had threatened to 
destroy his family. Luff testified that was his greatest fear 
and that he believed Lundgren was capable of harming his 
family."). 
{) 
Imminence of Threat 
In Cross, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the duress 
defense required a 1hreat of "present, imminent, immediate 
and impending death, or serious bodily injury:· 58 Ohio 
St.2d at 487. Similarly, in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 
394, 409 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court observed: 
"Duress was said to excuse criminal conduct where the 
actor was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or se-
rious bodily injury, which threat caused the actor to engage 
in conduct violating the literal terms of the criminal law." 
In other words, "[f]ear of future harm cannot be the basis 
of such a defense." State v. Good, 110 Ohio App. 415; 419, 
165 N.E.2d 28 (1960): 
The force which is claimed to have compelled criminal 
conduct against the will of the actor must be immedi-
ate and continuous and threaten grave danger to this 
person during all the time the act is being committed. 
That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened "in 
praesenti." It must be a force threatening great bodily 
harm and remains constant in controlling the will of the 
unwilling participant while the act is being performed 
and from which he cannot then withdraw in safety. 
The rationale underlying the imminence requirement is 
the notion that the necessity to commit the crime is absent if 
the defendant has time to contact the police or otherwise re-
frain from committing the crime at that time. As the United 
States Supreme Court has commented: "[l]n the context of 
prison escape, the escapee is not entitled to claim a de-
fense of duress ... unless and until he demonstrates that, 
given the imminence of the threat, violation of [the escape 
statute] was his only reasonable alternative." United States 
v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 411 (1980). 
The duress defense does not extend to a situation where 
drug offenses occurred over a period of several weeks, 
"during which time the defendant was, for the most part, 
completely free from any possible domination." State v. 
Good, 110 Ohio App. 415, 420, 165 N.E.2d 28 (1960). Nor, 
does the defense apply where there are legal alternatives. 
"Under any definition of these defenses one principle 
remains constant: If there was a reasonable, legal alterna-
tive to violating the law, 'a chance both to refuse to do the 
criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harms,' the 
" defense will fail." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 
D (1980) (citation omitted). 
As the Ohio Supreme Court pointed out in Cross, "there 
was ample time and means available to resort to the legal 
system. Escape was not the only viable and reasonable 
choice available." 58 Ohio St.2d at 487-88. 
3 
Escape 
There may be an additional requirement when duress is 
raised as a defense to the crime of escape. In Cross, the 
Court stated that the "coup de grace is the fact that appel-
lant failed to turn himself in immediately after fleeing the 
supposed intolerable conditions. This makes it very clear 
what the defendant's intention were and that he purposely 
escaped to flee the system and for no other reason." 58 
Ohio St.2d at 482. Another way to view this issue is not as 
an element of the defense but as an evidentiary inference to 
show that fear of death or serious injury was not present. 
The United States Supreme Court reached the same con-
clusion by classifying escape as a continuing offense. In 
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,411-12 (1980), the 
Court ruled that "an escapee must first offer evidence justi-
fying his continued absence from custody as well as his ini-
tial departure and that an indispensable element of such an 
offer is testimony of a bona fide effort to surrender or return 
to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had 
lost its coercive force." 
Death Penalty Cases 
The Ohio capital punishment statute recognizes duress 
as a mitigating factor in death penalty cases. R.C. 
2929.04(B)(2) ("Whether it is unlikely that the offense would 
have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was 
under duress, coercion, or strong provocation."). 
NECESSITY 
Necessity is recognized as a defense to criminal liability 
under some circumstances. It is similar to the defense of 
duress. The principal difference is that duress involves a 
human threat, whereas necessity involves a threat from nat-
ural forces: 
Common law historically distinguished between the 
defenses of duress and necessity .... While the de-
fense of duress covered the situation where the coer-
cion had its source in the actions of other human be-
ings, the defense of necessity, or choice of evils, tradi-
tionally covered the situation where physical forces be-
yond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the 
lesser of two evils. Thus, where A destroyed a dike be-
cause B threatened to kill him if he did not, A would 
argue that he acted under duress, whereas if A de-
stroyed the dike in order to protect more valuable prop-
erty flooding, A could claim a defense of necessity. 
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1980). 
However, "[m]odern cases have tended to blur the distinc-
tion between duress and necessity." ld. at 410. In State v. 
Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 483 n. 2, 391 N.E.2d 319 (1979), 
the Ohio Supreme Court wrote: 
The terms "necessity'' and "duress" are distinct, yet are 
often used interchangeably and are often indistin-
guishable. They share in common the fact that they 
provide an excuse, justification or affirmative defense 
to a criminal charge. Running throughout their mean-
ings is the theme that imminent, immediate danger or 
threat of danger prevents the actor from exercising his 
own will, and there is no alternate path to take. 
Therefore, the actor is forced to choose between the 
lesser of two evils. 
The test for necessity is objective; a good faith belief in the 
necessity of one's conduct is insufficient. In State v. Prince, 
71 Ohio App.3d 6.94, 699, 595 N.E.2d 376 (1991), the court 
of appeals set forth the elements of the necessity defense: 
l 
I 
The necessity defense justifies conduct which other-
wise would lead to criminal or civil liability because the 
conduct is socially acceptable and desirable under the 
circumstances. The common law elements of neces-
sity are: (1) the harm must be committed under the 
pressure of physical or natural force, rather than 
human force: (2} the harm sought to be avoided is 
greater than, or at least equal to that sought to be pre-
vented by the law defining the offense charged; (3} the 
actor reasonably believes at the moment that his act is 
necessary and is designed to avoid the greater harm; 
(4) the actor must be without fault in bringing about the 
situation; and (5) the harm threatened must be immi-
nent, leaving no alternative by which to avoid the 
greater harm. 
Necessity is a defense to criminal liability, except for 
homicide. In United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (Pa. 
1842}, the defendant, following the mate's orders to spare 
women, children, and husbands, helped throw fourteen 
male passengers from an overloaded life boat after a disas-
ter at sea. Holmes was convicted of manslaughter on an in-
struction that indicated that a seaman was obligated to sac-
rifice himself to save the passengers. In another famous 
case, Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, Eng. 
Rep. (1881 to 1885), two shipwrecked seamen in a lifeboat 
killed another seaman to avoid starvation. The court ruled 
that they were not justified in taking an innocent life to save 
their own. 
INTOXICATION 
Intoxication may be a defense under limited circum-
stances. Intoxication includes drugs as well as alcohol. State 
v. Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 442, 653 N.E.2d 271 (1995} ("co-
caine intoxication"); State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 614 
N.E.2d 916 (1992} ("marijuana"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 833 
(1993}. 
There are two types of intoxication: voluntary (self-
induced) and involuntary intoxication. Involuntary intoxica-
tion is rare and is treated like insanity. "Involuntary 
intoxication ... does constitute a defense if it puts the 
defendant in such a state of mind, e.g., so that he does not 
know the nature and quality of his act or know that his act is 
wrong, in a jurisdiction which has adopted the M'Nagten 
test for insanity." 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal 
Law§ 4.10(f), at 558 (1986}. 
Voluntary intoxication 
Voluntary intoxication is recognized as a defense only 
when it negates a required mental element of the charged 
crime. In State v. Otte, 74 Ohio St.3d 554, 564, 660 N.E.2d 
710 (1996}, the Ohio Supreme Court recently observed: 
"Voluntary intoxication is not a defense, but where specific 
intent is a necessary element of the crime charged, the fact 
of intoxication may be shown to negate this element if the 
intoxication is such as to preclude the formation of such in-
tent." 
The defense is most often raised in aggravated murder 
prosecutions. "[l]n the cases of first degree murder, involv-
ing the element of deliberation and premeditation, the fact of 
intoxication may be considered to determine whether the 
deliberation and premeditation existed." Long v. State, 109 
Ohio St. 77, 87, 141 N.E. 691 (1923}. But the defense is not 
limited to such cases. For example, in State v. Mundy, 99 
Ohio App.3d 275,314, 650 N.E.2d 502 (1994}, a gross sex-
ual imposition case, the defendant "testified that 'if it hap-
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pened, it had to happen while I was drinking" and that there 
was never any intention on his part to touch these victims in 
a sexual manner for sexual gratification." The court of ap-
peals concluded that the trial court erred by not giving an in-
tox~cation instruction as requested. In State v. Davis, 81 ~)'). 
Oh1o App.3d 706,712-13,612 N.E.2d 343 (1992}, the court '12/', 
of appeals commented that the "crime of escape under R.C. 
2921.34 is a specific intent crime; thus, voluntary intoxica-
tion can serve as a defense to negate the specific intent ele-
ment." 
Partial defense 
Intoxication is often referred to as a partial defense; it 
does not completely exculpate the defendant''s conduct, but 
it may reduce the crime to lesser included offenses_i.e., 
from aggravated murder to murder. While the term "partial 
defense" is often used, it is technically misleading because 
intoxication is a "complete" defense to the greater offense 
(aggravated murder). 
Ohio cases 
Nichols v. State, 8 Ohio St. 435, 439 (1858}, decided in 
the last century, is apparently the first Ohio case on intoxica-
tion. The Ohio Supreme Court held that evidence of intoxi-
cation is admissible "to show that the accused did not at the 
time intend to do the act which he did do:· The Court, how-
ever, also ruled that an instruction was not required. The 
Court believed it had "gone far enough" because "[i]ntoxica-
tion is easily simulated. It is often voluntarily induced for the 
sole purpose of nerving a wicked heart to the firmness req-
uisite for the commission of a crime soberly premeditated, 
or as an excuse for such crime." ld. at 439. 
In Long v. State, 109 Ohio St. 77, 91, 141 N.E. 691 ·· 1, (1923}, a 1923 murder decision, the Ohio Supreme Court ~l))J~,1i referred to intoxication as "an unfavored defense" and set 
forth the basic principles of the defense: 
It is well established in American jurisprudence that 
drunkenness is not a defense to crime. When all the 
elements of a criminal act have been proven the ac-
cused will not as a general rule be heard to allege his 
voluntary intoxication as an excuse. It is an exception 
to this general rule that one who is accused of a crime, 
the definition of which involves some specific intent, or 
the operation of other mental processes, intoxication, 
though voluntary, may be considered in determining 
whether or not the act was intentional, or, as in the 
cases of first degree murder, involving the element of 
deliberation and premeditation, the fact of intoxication 
may be considered to determine whether the delibera-
tion and premeditation existed. ld. at 86-87. 
The Court went on to note that "in order to render the ac-
cused guiltless, the intoxication must be so great and com-
plete as to make him incapable of forming the intent, or of 
acting with deliberation and premeditation." ld. at 87. 
More recent cases are consistent. In State v. Huertas, 51 
Ohio St.3d 22, 28, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (1990}, the defendant 
argued that intoxication caused him to lack the requisite 
prior calculation and design. The Supreme Court noted, 
'The mere fact that a defendant is intoxicated does not 
make him incapable of acting with prior calculation and de- t.. 1 ~: sign. Intoxication 'is often voluntarily induced for the sole '11Ui 
purpose of nerving a wicked heart to the firmness requisite 
for the commission of a crime soberly premeditated, or as 
an excuse for such crime."' The Court found sufficient evi-
dence of prior calculation from the earlier threats Huertas 
had made. 
In State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 602, 605 N.E.2d 
916 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 833 (1993), an aggravat-
ed murder case, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no 
~· ·,..---,· evidence that Slagle "was too intoxicated to form the specif-
l)jl. £ ic intent to kill." The police officers testified that, when they 
apprehended Slagle at the victim's residence, he was alert, 
responsive, had no alcoholic odor, and showed no physical 
signs of intoxication. Although Slagle alleged that he had 
consumed a large amount of beer prior to committing the 
murder, he never on<;:e requested to go to the bathroom in 
the five hours he was detained at the scene. Moreover, the 
fact that Slagle (1) entered through the front window be-
cause he knew it to be the farthest from the victim's bed-
1 
room and from view of his family's adjacent house, (2) that 
he systematically searched the house by stealth, and (3) 
I 
that he removed his shoes to make less sound served to 
I 
establish a "rational and non-impaired cognitive process:· 
Burden of Proof 
A troublesome aspect of Long concerns the Court's com-
ment on the burden of persuasion, which the Court allocat-
ed to the accused: "rrJhe burden is upon such defendant to 
establish such defense by a preponderance of the evi-
dence." ld. (syllabus, para. 4). This allocation of the burden 
of proof continues as the rule in Ohio today. It is, however, 
illogical and probably unconstitutional. 
The Ohio courts have repeatedly stated that intoxication 
is relevant only if it negates a specific intent. State v. Mundy, 
99 Ohio App.3d 275, 314, 650 N.E.2d 502 (1994) (The in-
toxication instruction should state that if the jury found that 
the defendant had established "by a preponderance or 
f3 greater wei~ht of the eviden_ce that at the time these crimes 
· were committed he was so mfluenced by alcohol that he 
was not capable of forming the required purpose or specific 
intent, then the jury was required to find Mundy not guilty, 
because purpose or specific intent is an essential element 
of the offense charged."). 
The prosecution, however, has the burden of persuasion 
on every essential element of the offense, including mens 
rea elements if the crime is defined as requiring a mental el-
ement. It is inconsistent to say that the prosecution has the 
burden of persuasion for the "specific intent" element (be-
yond a reasonable doubt) but the accused also has the bur-
den of persuasion (by a preponderance) on the same issue. 
This inconsistency is illustrated by State v. French, 171 Ohio 
St. 501, 505, 172 N.E.2d 613 (1961 ), in which the Supreme 
Court found "no error in the charge of the trial court which 
placed on the defendant the burden of proof of incapacity to 
commit rape because of intoxication." However, in an earlier 
passage, the Court wrote: 
Insanity, duress and self-defense are generally consid-
ered to be affirmative defenses and the burden of prov-
ing them by a preponderance of the evidence rests on 
him who asserts them. But not all evidence offered by 
an accused is to be regarded as an affirmative de-
fense. It may be introduced, as is claimed here, not to 
excuse or justify an admitted act but only to rebut mat-
ters essential to be proved by the state. There may be 
occasions where it would be incumbent on the state to 
C show intoxication as part of its proof, but the instant 
case is certainly not of that character. The state, hav-
ing by its case in chief presented evidence of venue, 
age of defendant, and forcible rape, would have had 
no interest in showing intoxication, and any evidence 
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on that subject introduced by the defendant must nec-
essarily be a defense, whetherwe call it simply a de-
fense or an affirmative defense. ld. at 504. 
Voluntary intoxication, as defined by the Ohio courts, is 
similar to other "failure of proof" defenses such as mistake 
of fact or accident. The intoxication instruction therefore 
should be considered as an elaboration on the mens rea in-
struction of "purpose." Like mistake and accident, there 
must be some evidence in the record to warrant such an in-
struction on intoxication. 
Instructions 
The Ohio Supreme Court has "traditionally recognized a 
trial judge's discretion as to whether to instruct a jury on in-
toxication as a defense:· State v. Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 
443, 653 N.E.2d 271 (1995). Accord State v. Fox, 68 Ohio 
St.2d 33, 428 N.E.2d 410 (1981); Nichols v. State, 8 Ohio 
St. 435 (1858); State v. Mundy, 99 Ohio App.3d 275, 314, 
650 N.E.2d 502 (1994) ('Whether the evidence presented in 
a particular case is sufficient to require a jury instruction on 
intoxication is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial 
court."). 
Failure to request the instruction constitutes a waiver and 
the issue will be reviewed on appeal only for plain error. 
State v. Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 442, 653 N.E.2d 271 (1995) 
("Hill failed to request any instruction as to the effect of in-
toxication. Thus, Hill waived all but plain error:'). 
In State v. Fox, 68 Ohio St.2d 53, 57, 428 N.E.2d 410 
(1981 ), an attempted murder case, the Court recognized 
the appropriateness of a special jury charge but left that de-
cision to the discretion of the trial court, concluding that the 
trial court had not abused its discretion - "not enough evi-
dence was introduced to warrant the requested instruction." 
In State v. Wolons, 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 69, 541 N.E.2d 443 
{1989), the defendant was convicted of murdering his broth-
er after a night of partying and alcohol consumption. The 
trial court refused to instruct on intoxication, finding that the 
level of inebriation imputed from the victim's blood alcohol 
level fell "short of negating a conscious awareness of the 
circumstances and events that transpired on the night of the 
stabbing." The appellate court reversed. The Supreme 
Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals, stating that the 
standard of review was an abuse of discretion. 
In State v. Hicks, 43 Ohio St.3d 72, 75, 538 N.E.2d 1030 
(1989), the Supreme Court held that "[v]oluntary intoxication 
is a defense to a crime where specific intent is a necessary 
element of the crime and ''the intoxication was such as to 
preclude the formation of such intent." The Court further 
noted that evidence which, if believed, would serve to ac-
quit, is sufficient to raise the defense. However, in this case, 
the Court held that intoxication could not be a defense be-
cause there was no reasonable doubt that the defendant 
lacked purpose when he returned to the crime scene to 
murder his daughter, who he knew was the only witness to 
his first killing. 
Diminished Capacity 
Ohio does not recognize the defense of diminished ca-
pacity. In rejecting that defense, the Ohio Supreme Court 
concluded that an analogy between diminished capacity 
and intoxication would not stand close scrutiny. 'While we 
concede that there is a superficial attractiveness to the in-
toxication-diminished capacity analogy, upon closer exami-
nation we ... find the concepts to be quite disparate." State 
v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St.2d 182, 193,436 N.E.2d 523 (1982). 
In the Court's view, it takes little expertise for jurors to de-
cide whether intoxication precluded a defendant from pos-
sessing the requisite mental state. In contrast, the "finely 
differentiated psychiatric concepts associated with dimin-
ished capacity demands a sophistication (or as critics would 
maintain a sophistic bent) that jurors ... ordinarily have not 
developed:' ld. at 182. 
Attempts to introduce diminished-capacity evidence 
through the "backdoor'' of an intoxication defense is imper-
missible. In State v. Huertas, 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 553 N.E.2d 
1058 (1990), the defendant was convicted of murder when 
he killed a man whom he had told, one week earlier, that he 
would kill if the victim did not stop dating Huertas' former 
girlfriend. Huertas acknowledged consuming 6-19 beers, 6-
10 shots of rum, 1/4-1/2 a gram of cocaine and smoking ap-
proximately five marijuana cigarettes on the night of the 
murder. The Court perceived Huertas asattempting to raise 
a diminished capacity defense and refused to let a defense 
expert testify as to the effects of intoxication and the ability 
of an intoxicated person to suffer a blackout. 
A UBI 
As the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized, alibi "is not 
an affirmative defense." State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 21, 
294 N.E.2d 888 (1973). In Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 
245, 163 N.E. 28 (1928), the Court noted that its decisions 
have 
clearly pointed out the difference between an alibi and 
an affirmative defense, such as insanity ... 
It is further correctly considered as a defense in the 
sense that the state is not bound to meet it until the 
issue has been raised by defensive testimony. It is fur-
ther a defense in the sense that the state may offer re-
butting testimony, though no testimony was adduced 
by the state on the subject in submitting its case in 
chief. It is only inaccurate to call it a defense in the 
sense that it is not in the nature of confession and 
avoidance. An alibi conclusively presupposes that the 
defendant had no participation in the commission of 
the crime, and that it was impossible for him to have 
participated because of his absence during the time 
and at the place of the commission of the crime. 
Thus, an "alibi is, strictly speaking, not a defense, though 
usually called such in criminal procedure:' State v. Norman, 
103 Ohio St. 541, 542, 134 N.E. 211 (1928). The Court 
went on to comment: "A defense generally involves the duty 
that it be supported by some quantity of proof, casting the 
burden upon the party relying upon it. In that sense, an alibi 
is not a defense. It is a term used merely to meet the gen-
eral issue of not guilty .... In short, the defendant tenders 
proof that the place at which he was at the time of the com-
mission of the alleged crime at least raises a reasonable 
doubt that he committed the crime:' 
The "alibi defense" means that the accused did not com-
mit the crime; the accused was some place else. The pros-
ecution, of course, must prove that the accused committed 
the crime (an essential element) beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See State v. Childs, 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 64, 236 
N.E.2d 545 (1968) ("[T]he burden of proof remains with the 
state even with respect to alibi evidence:'). Accordingly, a 
jury instruction allocating the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant is plain error. State v. Walker, 2 Ohio App.2d 483, 
2 OBR 610,442 N.E.2d 1319 (1981). In addition, a defen-
dant's "failure" to conclusively establish an alibi does not 
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alter the prosecution's burden of proof. In Toler v. State, 16 
Ohio St. 583, 585 (1866), the Supreme Court wrote: 
It is by no means true in law, that the defense of alibi 
admits the body of the crime or offense charged. It is 
an admission of nothing that is charged in the indict-
ment, and denied by the general plea of not guilty. It is 
not a plea, but a defense under the plea of not guilty .... 
It is true, as the court say, that where the attempt to 
prove the alibi fails, the evidence offered in support of 
it may nevertheless be considered by the jury as oth-
erwise affecting the case, than it bearing upon the par-
ticular question of the alibi. The defense's case is often 
much weakened by an unsuccessful attempt to prove 
an alibi. But this result happens not because of any 
implied or technical admission involved in the attempt, 
but because of fraud and subornation of perjury mani-
fested in the attempt. It does not create an inference 
that the defendant was present at the scene of the 
crime. 
See Ohio Jury Instruction 411.03(1) ("If the evidence fails to 
establish that the defendant was elsewhere, such failure 
does not create an inference that the defendant was present 
at the time when and at the place where an offense may 
have been committed."). 
That is not to say that failure may not affect how the jury 
views the defense case. "An alibi is not only a legitimate, 
but a very complete, defense, when sufficiently sustained by 
evidence. But when this issue is presented by an accused 
and the evidence fails to sustain it, but, on the contrary, 
traces him to the very place at a given time, at which he 
says he was not, the situation becomes very dangerous for 
the accused." Scaccutto v. State, 118 Ohio St. 397, 401, 
161 N.E. 211 (1928). 
Further, the jury is not required to accept an alibi de-
fense. If the trial court, however, decides that because of 
the alibi evidence, a reasonable jury could not find that the 
defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the court is required to grant a motion to acquit: 
In light of the nature of appellant's alibi evidence, vis a 
vis the evidence presented by the state in rebuttal of 
the alibi, there must be some doubt in a reasonable 
mind as to the guilt of appellant. To conclude other-
wise is to argue that the average reasonable mind 
would be convinced that one confined in the Cuyahoga 
County jail could manage to escape therefrom, could 
travel to another county, there to commit a murder, and 
could later re-enter the jail facility, undetected, only to 
be subsequently release by an order of the court. State 
v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 221, 378 N.E.2d 1049 
(1978) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 441 
U.S. 924 (1979). 
Instructions 
From an evidentiary perspective, alibi is defensive in the 
sense that "some" evidence of alibi must be admitted in evi-
dence before a jury instruction is required. See Ohio Jury 
Instruction 411.03(1) ("The defendant claims that he was at 
some other place at the time the offense occurred. This is 
known as an alibi. The word 'alibi' means elsewhere or a 
different place."). 
Notice of Alibi Rule 
Criminal Rule 12.1 governs notice of alibi. It provides 
that when a defendant in a criminal case plans to offer testi-
mony to establish an alibi, the defendant must file a written 
~mit/ 
notice with the prosecuting attorney not less than seven 
days before trial. The notice must include specific informa-
tion as to the place at which the defendant claims to have 
been at the time of the alleged offense. 
ACCIDENT 
In State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 20, 294 N.E.2d 888 
(1973), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that "it has long been 
establish~d that accident is not an affirmative defense in this 
state." It is a claim that the defendant lacked the requisite 
men~ rea of the charged offense. In Jones v. State, 51 Ohio 
St. 331, 342, 38 N.E. 79 (1894), the Court wrote: 
The intent or purpose, to kill, being an essential con-
stituent of the offense, should be averred and proven. 
This purpose, like every other material averment of the 
indictment, is put in issue by the plea of not guilty and 
to authorize a conviction must be proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Where the state has shown that the 
death was the result of design, purpose; or intent-
and these terms in this relation are synonymous -
then the notion of accident is necessarily excluded. 
That which is designedly or purposely accomplished 
cannot, in the very nature of things be accidental. 
! Therefore, when the plaintiff in error introduced evi-l dence tending to prove that the gun was accidentally 
'''I
I discharged, he was merely controverting the truth of 
the averment in the indictment that it was purposely 
discharged. 
/ In short, accident is not an affirmative defense like self-
\
. defense and insanity. An "absence of mistake or accidenf' 
is "not a separate category but merely a converse of the ex-
1,1 istence of specific intent." State v. Snowden, 49 Ohio 
') f) L,j ,J App.2d 7, 12,359 N.E.2d 87 (1976). For example, a defen-
dant charged with murder who testifies that the weapon dis-
charged "accidently" because he was unfamiliar with 
firearms is raising a defense of accident, which tends to 
negate the mens rea element of purpose. Consequently, 
the jury may not be instructed that the burden of proving ac-
cident is on the defense. Ohio Jury Instructions § 411.01 (2) 
(1994) ("An accidental result is one that occurs unintention-
ally and without any design or purpose to bring it about. An 
accident is mere physical happening or evidence, out the 
usual order of things and not reasonably (anticipated) (fore-
seen) as a natural or probable result of a lawful act."). 
'•i {: 
The assertion of accident as a defense may permit the 
prosecution to introduce, under Evidence Rule 404(8), evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs or acts. See 1 Giannelli & 
Snyder, Ohio Evidence § 404.18 (3d ed 1996). For example, 
in State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 471, 620 N.E.2d 50 
(1993), the Court commented: ''The existence of these 
basement fires, not caused by the bedroom fire, tended to 
prove arson upstairs and negate the possibility of accident. 
Moreover, these fires tended to show a common plan or 
scheme and identify Grant as the arsonist." See also State 
v. McCornell, 91 Ohio App.3d 141, 147,631 N.E.2d 1110 
(1993) (''The two serious physical injuries caused by appel-
lant to [his wife] and her stories about them [being acciden-
tal] are too coincidental to be left unchallenged by the 
state."). 
MISTAKE OF FACT 
Mistake of fact is a defense if the mistake negates a men-
tal state required for a crime. "Ignorance or mistake as to a 
matter of fact or law is a defense if it negatives a mental 
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state required to establish a material element of the crime, 
except that if the defendant would be guilty of another crime 
had the situation been as he believed, then he may be con-
victed of the offense which he would be guilty had the situa-
tion been as he believed it to be." 1 LaFave & Scott, 
Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1, at 575 (1986). Accord 
Ohio Jury Instructions 409.03(1) ("Unless the defendant had 
the required (purpose) (knowledge) he is not guilty of the 
crime .. :•; (2) "In determining whether the defendant had 
the required (purpose) (knowledge) you will consider 
whether he acted under a mistake of fact ... "). 
The commentators to the Model Penal Code stated it this 
way: 
Thus ignorance or mistake is a defense when it nega-
tives the existence of state of mind that is essential to 
the commission of an offense, or when it establishes a 
state of mind that constitutes a defense under a rule of 
law relating to defenses. In other words, ignorance or 
mistake has only evidential import; it is significant 
whenever it is logically relevant, and it may be logically 
relevant to negate the required mode of culpability or 
to establish a special defense. American Law Institute, 
Modef Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.04, at 269 
(1985). 
Thus, the defense of mistake is much like the defense of ac-
cident Neither is an affirmative defense; both involve a 
claim that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea of 
the charged offense. An "absence of mistake or accident" is 
"not a separate category but merely a converse of the exis-
tence of specific intent." State v. Snowden, 49 Ohio App.2d 
7, 12, 359 N.E.2d 87 (1976). For example, a defendant who 
claims that she made a mistake about the nature of a con-
trolled substance is asserting a lack of mens rea, i.e., 
knowledge that the substance was heroin. 
Instead of speaking of ignorance or mistake of fact or 
law as a defense, it would be just as easy to note sim-
ply that the defendant cannot be convicted when it is 
shown that he does not have the mental state required 
by law for commission of that particular offense. For 
example, to take the classic case of the man who takes 
another's umbrella out of a restaurant because he mis-
takenly believes that the umbrella is his, it is not really 
necessary to say that the man, if charged with larceny, 
has a valid defense of mistake of fact; it would be more 
direct and to the point to assert that the man is not 
guilty because he does not have the mental state (in-
tent to steal the property of another) required for the 
crime of larceny. Yet, the practice has developed of 
dealing with such mistakes as a matter of defense, 
perhaps because the facts showing their existence are 
usually brought out by the defendant .... 1 LaFave & 
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1 (a), at 576 
(1986). 
An assertion of mistake as a defense may permit the 
prosecution to introduce, under Evidence Rule 404(8), evi-
dence of "other acts" to negate the mistake claim. 1 
Giannelli & Snyder, Ohio Evidence § 404.18 (3d ed 1996). 
Accordingly, a defendant claiming that she was mistaken 
about the nature of a controlled substance (e.g., heroin) 
may open the door to the admissibility of her prior heroin 
transactions to show that she is familiar with heroin and thus 
a "mistake" is unlikely. 
MISTAKE OF LAW 
There are two types of mistake of law. First, a mistake of 
law, like a mistake of fact, may negate a required mental 
state (mens rea). "Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of 
fact or law is a defense if it negatives a mental state re-
quired to establish a material element of the crime .... " 1 
LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1, at 575 
(1986). Often, this type of mistake involves a mistake of 
civil, not criminal, law- e.g., property or domestic relations 
law. If a defendant, whose automobile has been repos-
sessed, believes she is still the lawful owner of the vehicle 
and takes it, this mistake of property law negates the mental 
element for theft or larceny. 
It bears repeating here that the cause of much of the 
confusion concerning the significance of the defen-
dant's ignorance or mistake of law is the failure to dis-
tinguish two quite different situations: (1) that in which 
the defendant consequently lacks the mental state re-
quired for commission of the crime and thus ... has a 
valid defense; and (2) that in which the defendant still 
had whatever mental state is required for commission 
of the crime and only claims that he was unaware that 
such conduct was proscribed by the criminal law, 
which ... is ordinarily not a recognized defense. ld. at 
585. 
The second type of mistake or ignorance of law involves 
the criminal law that the defendant is charged with violating. 
Here, the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" applies. 
A belief, even a reasonable one, that the actor's conduct 
does not constitute a crime is irrelevant. 
Except for one particular situation ... , it is usually an 
easy task to determine in which of these two cate-
gories the defendant's mistake belongs. For example, 
the crime of larceny is not committed if the defendant, 
because of a mistaken understanding of the law of 
property, believed that the property taken belonged to 
him; it is committed, however, if the defendant believed 
it was lawful to take certain kinds of property belong-
ing to others because of the custom in the community 
to do so. The requisite mental state (intent to steal) is 
lacking only in the first of these two cases, for it "is not 
the intent to violate the law but the intentional doing the 
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act which is a violation of law" which is proscribed. 1 
LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1 (d), at 
585 (1 986) (citation omitted). 
Exceptions 
A limited number of exceptions to the general rule that 
mistake of law is no defense have been recognized. First, if 
a criminal statute has not been published or is not reason-
ably available, there may be a defense. Second, if the de-
fendant reasonably relied upon an official statement of law, 
later determined to be invalid or erroneous, there may be a 
defense. This defense would include a statement in a (1) 
statute, (2) judicial decision, (3) an administrative order, or 
(4) an official interpretation of the public officer or body 
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting, adminis-
trating, or enforcing the law defining the offense. See 1 
LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 5.1 (e) (1 986). 
An interpretation by a lawyer is not covered by this de-
fense. "The principal reason for this position apparently is 
that the risk of collusion is greater and that those desiring to 
circumvent the law would shop around for bad advice." 1 
LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 5.1 (e)(4), at 
595 (1 986). 
Where recognized, these exceptions are considered affir-
mative defenses. As the commentary to the Model Penal 
Code observed: 
All of the categories dealt with in the formulation [of 
this defense) involve, for the most part, situations 
where the act charged is consistent with the entire law-
abidingness of the actor, where the possibility of collu-
sion is minimal, and where a judicial determination of 
the reasonableness of the belief in legality should not 
present substantial difficulty. American Law Institute, 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.04, at 275 
(1 985). 
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